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I. INTRODUCTION
The evolutionary development of alternative dispute resolution (ADR)
in the United States has come to a crossroads. Courts and legislatures are
struggling to define the proper contexts in which ADR may be utilized and
the proper scope of its use within a given field. In so doing, courts and
legislatures have been forced to re-evaluate the purposes which justify the
employment of ADR by the public sector. An examination of courts and
legislatures in the 1990s reveals a significant shift in the original
formulation of ADR as a system of voluntary, extrajudicial alternatives to a
formulation in which it is viewed as a system of cost-efficient and time-
efficient mechanisms which a court may utilize, at its own discretion, to
compel party participation in extrajudicial dispute resolution processes.' In
the 1990s, one finds voluntarism, an ingredient traditionally viewed as
integral to the potential success of ADR, as a dispensable, historical
artifact.
Many proponents of compulsory ADR mechanisms claim that ADR is
capable of achieving cost-efficient and time-efficient resolutions to complex
disputes absent the parties' consent. 2 Entitlement to one's "day in court"
may now be conditioned upon the parties' submission to ADR procedures
and its consequent expense and delay. 3 The proposition that a public forum
may mandate the private resolution of disputes between unwilling parties
does not contemplate an evolutionary refinement of ADR, but rather,
promises a significant transformation of ADR in the coming century.
This Note offers a comprehensive examination of the current need to
identify the proper limitations to be placed upon the use of ADR. The
identification of the inherent, conceptual limitations of ADR, coupled with
the recognition of a need to balance the individual autonomy of a litigant
against the practical imperatives which have been placed upon the judiciary
to expedite the disposition of cases, is necessary to determine how best to
preserve the value and integrity of ADR into the next century.
This Note will first give a brief historical background of the ongoing
1 See Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990, 28 U.S.C. § 475 (1990); UNITED STATES
DIsTRIcT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN Dismicr OF OHIO, ANNUAL ASSESSMENT OF CIVIL AND
CRIMINAL DOCKET PURSUANT TO CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM AcT OF 1990 (January 29, 1993)
[hereinafter ANNUAL ASSESSMENT]; OHIO REV. CODE ANN. Ch. 2711 (Anderson 1992).
2 Interview with C. Eileen Pruett, Coordinator of Dispute Resolution Programs for the
Supreme Court of Ohio, in Columbus, OH (Jan. 27, 1994).
3 Arabian American Oil Co. v. Scarfone, 119 F.R.D. 448, 449 (M.D. Fla. 1988).
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evolution of ADR to better articulate the concerns of those demanding that
limitations be placed upon the use of mandated ADR. Once a historical
foundation has been laid, this Note will then compare and contrast
competing policy concerns and explanations for the use or non-use of
mandated ADR procedures.
The recent decision of the Sixth Circuit in In re NLO, Inc.4 broke with
precedent and the majority of federal circuit courts by recognizing limits
upon the power of federal district courts to compel participation in summary
jury trials. Accordingly, this Note will examine similar attempts to place
limitations upon the use of ADR as well as comprehensively explore the
implications and effectiveness of judicially and legislatively-mandated
ADR. The Ohio Revised Code § 3109.052 Shared Parenting provision,5 the
Annual Assessment of Civil and Criminal Docket for the United States
District Court for the Northern District of Ohio, 6 and the Pilot Arbitration
Project for the Boone County Circuit Court of Kentucky will be examined.
The examination will provide an analysis of compulsory ADR on the
federal, state, and county levels.
The inherent power of the federal judiciary to compel the use of ADR
upon unwilling litigants is based upon a claim deriving from the inherent
powers granted to them under Rule 16 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure (Rule 16) to manage pretrial party activity. 7 The scope of
authority granted by Rule 16 has been a source of controversy among
federal courts. 8
In 1987, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit distinguished
itself from all other federal circuit courts when it forbade the imposition of
compulsory summary jury trials by a federal court. 9 On September 17,
1993, in In re NLO, Inc., the Sixth Circuit broke from the majority and
joined the Seventh Circuit in its interpretation of Rule 16.10 The Sixth
Circuit held that Rule 16 did not empower federal district court judges to
impose ADR upon unwilling litigants. The court found "[tihe district
court's order compelling participation in a summary jury trial under threat
4 5 F.3d 154 (6th Cir. 1993).
5 See generally OHIo REv. CODE ANN. §§ 3109.04, 3109.041, 3109.052 (Anderson
Supp. 1993).
6 ANNUAL ASSESSMENT, supra note 1.
7 Jennifer O'Hearne, Comment, Compelled Participation in Innovative Pretrial
Proceedings, 84 Nw. U. L. REV. 290, 293-94 (1989).
8 Day v. NLO, Inc., 147 F.R.D. 148, 151 (S.D. Ohio 1993).
9 Robert W. Bradford, Jr., The Mini-Trial and Summary Jury Trial, 52 ALA. L. RBV.
150, 153 (1991).
10 5 F.3d 154 (6th Cir. 1993).
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of sanctions to be clearly erroneous as a matter of law."" The decision
rendered by the Sixth Circuit will be examined to: 1) identify the policy
motivations behind the decision; 2) define the breadth of the decision in
comparison to the Seventh Circuit's 1987 decision in Strandell v. Jackson
Count 12; and 3) compare and contrast the competing arguments both for
and against the implementation of mandatory ADR procedures by the
courts.
The Ohio General Assembly has instituted provisions either favoring or
mandating the use of ADR in Chapters 2711 and 2712 of the Ohio Revised
Code. 13 In 1990, the legislature passed a provision in the domestic relations
sphere by which a court may order parties to mediate their differences over
a shared parenting agreement, and though not bound by the mediation
report, the state court may use it as a basis for its shared parenting
declaration. 14 This Note will examine the nature of the balance struck by the
Ohio legislature in enacting legislatively-mandated ADR.
The U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Ohio released its
annual assessment of the civil and criminal docket for 1992 in accordance
with the mandates of Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990.15 The contents of
the report will be examined and the activities of the Northern District Court
will be articulated in this Note.
The Boone County Circuit Court began an aggressive arbitration
program in the early 1990s in an effort to alleviate the immense caseload of
the one-judge court. An analysis of the program and recommendations for
modifications to the program will be analyzed.
Ultimately, the United States continues to appreciate the benefits of an
adversarial legal justice system. Incorporating the values of cooperation,
conciliation, and compromise-that are found within ADR-into a justice
system premised upon adversarial confrontation has perplexed courts and
legislatures. Legislatures and the courts are now faced with the arduous task
of striking a delicate balance between the rights of litigants and the value of
innovative judicial officers utilizing ADR to expedite the disposition of
ever-increasing caseloads.1 6 The 1990s find courts and legislatures at
crossroads where reconciliation must be achieved. This Note examines the
current struggle for reconciliation.
11 In reNLO, 5 F.3d at 156.
12 838 F.2d 884 (7th Cir. 1987).
13 Omo Rsv. CODE ANN. Ch. 2711 and 2712 (Anderson 1992).
14 OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 3109.052 (Anderson Supp. 1993).
15 ANNUAL ASSESSMENT, supra note 1.
16 Srrwudel, 838 F.2d at 886.
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II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
According to Professor Judith Resnik of the University of California, a
renowned authority in the field of ADR, the 1990s represent an era of
transformation in which the rights-based adversarial system of the United
States is seeking to resolve conflict by agreement or "dealmaking."17 In the
1980s, the informal ADR mechanism of arbitration became equated in value
with formal adjudication. Both methods of dispute resolution consequently
became fused so that the former weaknesses of arbitration are now
recognized as its strengths. 18 Accompanying this re-evaluation of arbitration
has been the onslaught of judicial enthusiasm for fostering settlement. It is
an era in which judges find themselves either descending to the role of a
litigant or practicing a new brand of "managerial judging. " 19 The recent
efforts of state legislatures and the executive branch of the federal
government may force the judiciary to redefine its role to reflect what it
actually does in practice. The Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990 and the
Administrative Dispute Resolution Act of 1990, along with orders from the
executive branch of the federal government strongly encouraging the use of
ADR,20 have arguably transformed judges into advocates for settlement.
These efforts at redefining the role of the judiciary and delegating fact-
finding duties to non-Article III judges has received the endorsement of
such notable jurists as Judge Posner, Judge Bork, and Justice Scalia, and
according to Resnik, promises to affect a "real transformation of the civil
process. "21
Resnick does, however, concede that a successful settlement requires
the production or discovery of all relevant information and party volition.
Resnick identifies volition as "the key" 22 to successful settlements because
it serves to validate the outcomes. This Note endorses the proposition that
the loss of voluntarism from the ADR equation as it is integrated into a
bifurcated state and federal adversarial system threatens to transform ADR
into a mere variation of conventional adjudication.
A. Original Development and Growth
Voluntary ADR began as a grass roots movement during the late 1960s.
17 Judith Resnik, Speech at The Ohio State University College of Law, "ADR's





22 Resnick, supra note 17.
[Vol. 10:1 1994]
COERCED COOPERATION IN ADR
Local groups and neighborhood organizations favored the use of ADR in
the context of local neighborhood centers.23 Emphasis on cooperation and
compromise preserved the integrity of the community while providing a
vehicle by which divisive conflict could be avoided. Such local centers
provided less formal, expensive, and hostile alternatives for feuding
neighbors.
The use of ADR expanded beyond the neighborhood and into particular
issue areas during the 1970s. The 1970s witnessed a recognition by the
medical community of the value of ADR.24 Concern over medical
malpractice litigation spawned a search for cost-efficient solutions designed
to accommodate competing interests as opposed to requiring one party's win
at the expense of another's total defeat. Doctors and patients forced into an
adversarial relationship proved to be inappropriate in many contexts. ADR
provided an appealing alternative. ADR enabled litigants to preserve the
integrity and privacy of the doctor-patient relationship while addressing the
competing interests of each party in the resolution of a medical malpractice
claim.
B. Rapid Growth of ADR Spurred by the Litigation Crisis of the
1980s
The "litigation crisis" of the 1980s necessitated the rapid expansion of
ADR across a broad range of areasY The prolific amount of complicated
litigation facing the courts and attorneys in the 1980s fostered a demand for
alternatives. ADR provided a cost-effective solution to an overburdened
judiciary and a simple, malleable solution for legislatures. The privatization
of dispute resolution also provided an attractive solution for the business
community. 26
ADR was utilized as a cost-effective means by which court dockets
could be efficiently managed or, at least, brought under control.
Legislatures faced with mounting costs and vexing delays responded by
legislating ADR as a mandatory procedure built into the legislative
framework. What was previously an alternative now became an imperative.
23 Lucy Katz, Compulsory Alternative Dispute Resolution And Voluntarism: Two-Headed
Monster or Two Sides ofA Coin?, 1993 J. DiS. RESOL. 1, 3 (1993).
24 Id. at 3.
25 Lauren K. Robel, Private Justice and the Federal Bench, 68 IND. L.J. 891, 893
(1993).
26 Kim A. Lambert, Fundamentals of Alternative Dispute Resolution,- 11 SPG
FRANCHISE L.J. 99, 99 (1992).
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C. ADR at a Crossroads
However, the expansion of ADR into a variety of contexts proceeded
without a clear definition of its limitations. The enthusiasm with which
courts and legislatures have come to embrace ADR has motivated them to
stretch the boundaries of its use. In search of satisfying results with less
public expenditure of time, effort, and moneys, courts and legislatures have
instituted measures designed to compel or induce parties to the ADR
bargaining table. The legislatures and courts theorize that once parties are
there, by whatever means, the chance for effective resolution remains
unchanged. 27 The burdens are deemed incidental in comparison to the
potential benefits.
But many litigants are petitioning the courts to recognize limits upon
attempts by legislatures and courts to compel or induce the private
resolution of disputes.28 They assert that such compulsion violates their
rights to due process, trial by jury, and the work product privilege, and
impermissibly extends the limits of discovery. 29 The 1990s has found
legislatures and the judiciary struggling to define those limits.
D. The Summary Jury Trial
In the late 1970s, Judge Thomas D. Lambros of the United States
District Court for the Northern District of Ohio pioneered the development
of the summary jury trial (SJT) as a means by which complex litigation may
be simplified or settled prior to trial.30 Judge Lambros contended that the
federal district courts have the authority to order parties to participate in
SJT proceedings under Rule 16.31 As formulated by Judge Lambros, and as
it is currently implemented in a majority of jurisdictions, an SJT possesses
the following characteristics:
27 Interview with C. Eileen Pruett, supra note 2. Pruett expressed the belief of many,
stating that once the initial barrier of bringing both parties to the bargaining table is overcome,
the success rate of such ADR mechanisms remains high.
28 See generally Strandell v. Jackson County, 838 F.2d 884, 885 (7th Cir. 1987); Day
v. NLO, Inc., 147 F.R.D. 148, 152 (S.D. Ohio 1993); In re NLO, Inc., 5 F.3d 154, 155 (6th
Cir. 1993); Cincinnati Gas & Elec. Co. v. General Elec. Co., 854 F.2d 900, 904 (6th Cir.
1988).
29 See New England Merchants Nat'l Bank v. Hughes, 556 F. Supp. 712, 714 (E.D.
Pa. 1983); Sirandell, 838 F.2d at 885; Day, 147 F.R.D. at 152. See also Katz, supra note 23,
at 9.
30 Bradford, supra note 9, at 151.
31 FED. R. CIrv. P. 16.
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1. SJT is ordered by the court, as opposed to the mini-trial, which is
strictly the product of voluntary choice and cooperation among
parties. 32
2. SJT is normally conducted by a judge or magistrate, as opposed to a
mediator or an arbitrator. 33
3. Before the commencement of an SJT, parties exchange information
which defines the permissible scope of their trial presentation.34
4. Each attorney is generally accorded two strikes from the available
jury pool.35
5. Attorneys then present an abbreviated version of their case to a jury
panel, normally composed of six jurors selected from the available
jury pool. 36
6. Each attorney is permitted to make an opening and closing statement
to the jury panel.37
7. The judge gives abbreviated jury instructions and frequently may
choose to submit a series of interrogatories for response by the
jury.38
8. The SJT typically lasts no longer than two days, after which time
the jury renders a nonbinding verdict. 39
9. The SJT does not abolish any substantive rights of the parties. Both
parties remain entitled to a binding trial on the merits. 40
10. Parties are then better able to assess their respective strengths and
weaknesses. The awareness of the realistic merits of their case, it is
32 Bradford, supra note 9, at 153.
33 Id.
34 Day v. NLO, Inc., 147 F.R.D. 148, 150 (S.D. Ohio 1993).
35 Bradford, supra note 9, at 153.
36 Cincinnati Gas & Electric Co v. General Elec. Co., 854 F.2d 900, 904 (6th Cir.
1988).
3 7 Day, 147 F.R.D. at 150.
38Id.
39 Bradford, supra note 9, at 153.
40 Arabian American Oil Co. v. Scarfone, 119 F.R.D. 448, 449 (M.D. Fla. 1988).
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theorized, facilitates settlement between parties.41
The federal circuits are split as to whether a federal district court
possesses the authority under Rule 16 to mandate the use of an SJT upon
unwilling litigants. The Seventh Circuit split the circuits in 1987 when it
held "the parameters of Rule 16 do not permit courts to compel parties to
participate in summary jury trials. "42
The Sixth Circuit has historically sanctioned the use of district court
orders requiring party participation in an SJT.43 This position was in accord
with the majority view which maintained that district courts have the power
to compel parties to participate in SJTs under the auspices of Rule 16. Rule
16 authorizes the federal courts to take action designed to insure effective
caseload management. 44 The majority of federal courts have endorsed
compulsory SJTs as an innovative technique which places parties in a more
realistic frame of mind when assessing their chances of success and their
risk of liability. 45 SJTs represent "[b]y far the most prominent ADR
innovation in the federal court system.... "46 As such, this Note will
examine the effect the current search for the proper limitations to be placed
on ADR had upon the use of mandatory SJTs by the federal courts.
III. COMPULSORY ADR IN THE 1990S
A. The Authority of Federal District Courts to Require Litigants to
Participate in a Nonbinding Summary Jury Trial
1. The Majority Rule
Rule 16 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure authorizes a federal
court, at its own discretion, to compel party attendance at a pretrial
conference to expedite the disposition of the action and to discuss "the
possibility of settlement or the use of extrajudicial procedures to resolve the
dispute. It is clear that both federal and state legislatures view ADR as an
effective means by which overly burdensome caseloads may be efficiently
managed. 48 As recently as January 20, 1993, the Southern District of Ohio,
41 Arabian American Oil Co., 119 F.R.D. at 449.
42 Standell v. Jackson County, 838 F.2d 884, 888 (7th Cir. 1987).
43 Cincinnati Gas & Electric Co., 854 F.2d at 901.
44 Day v. NLO, Inc., 147 F.R.D. 148, 153 (S.D. Ohio 1993).
45 Bradford, supra note 9, at 153.
46 Katz, supra note 23, at 13.
47 In re NLO, Inc., 5 F.3d 154, 157 (6th Cir. 1993).
48 See Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990, 28 U.S.C. § 475 (1990); ANNUAL
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a Sixth Circuit District Court, endorsed the prevalent view found within the
federal court system: Judges possess the power to compel participation in an
SJT.4 9
However, on September 17, 1993, the United States Court of Appeals
for the Sixth Circuit found a district court order "compelling participation
in a summary jury trial under threat of sanctions to be clearly erroneous as a
matter of law."50 The decision in In re NLO, Inc. represented a significant
departure from the general rule which vests broad discretionary powers in
district courts, under the dictates of Rule 16, to make every effort to settle
litigation before coming to trial.
The Seventh Circuit was the first federal circuit to deny district courts
the authority to compel participation in SJT proceedings. 51 It represented
the only circuit to take such a restrictive view of the extent of the broad
discretionary powers granted district courts by Rule 16. The Sixth Circuit is
the first circuit to join the Seventh Circuit in its interpretation of Rule 16.52
The SJT is traditionally viewed as an effective settlement device
enabling parties to get a realistic grasp of a case's probable outcome. The
court in In re NLO, Inc. viewed the compulsory SJT as an impermissibly
coercive tool as opposed to a means by which settlement can be facilitated
when it stated: "We do not question the proposition that summary jury trials
may be valuable tools in expediting cases. However, the voluntary
cooperation of the parties is required to maximize the effectiveness of such
proceedings. " 53
B. The Sixth Circuit and Summary Jury Trials
1. Day v. NLO, Inc.54
In the year In re NLO, Inc. was decided, the District Court for the
Southern District Court of Ohio followed the majority of circuit courts
when it stated in Day v. NLO, Inc.: "[The Defendants state in their Motion
to Reconsider that they will not actively participate in the summary jury
trial if it is open to the public. If the Defendants choose this course of
action, the Defendants and their counsel may be sanctioned accordingly." 55
ASSESSMENT, supra note 2.
4 9 Day, 147 F.R.D. at 148 n.1.
5 0 In re NLO, 5 F.3d at 156.
51 Strandell, 838 F.2d at 888.
52 Bradford, supra note 9, at 154; In re NLO, 5 F.3d at 157-58.
53 In re NLO, 5 F.3d at 158.
54 Day v. NLO, Inc., 147 F.R.D. 148 (S.D. Ohio 1993).
55 Id. at 154.
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The court premised its power to impose sanctions upon Rule 16(f). Rule
16(f) authorizes the court to impose sanctions upon any party failing to
conform with a scheduling or pretrial order. Sanctions may be imposed for
a complete failure to attend or perform as directed, but they may also be
levied against parties inadequately prepared to participate or against parties
participating in bad faith at a pretrial conference. Sanctions are imposed at
the court's discretion. 56
In re Fernald involved a suit brought by residents of Fernald, Ohio
against a nuclear weapons manufacturer in their community. 57 The
plaintiffs alleged that the manufacturer, National Lead of Ohio (NLO), had
exposed them to radiation and other hazardous materials. The plaintiffs
claimed damages for emotional distress, personal injury, and property
damage. NLO consistently refused to consider settlement discussions. 58
A trial on the merits would have been long and would have involved
complex issues of fact. Accordingly, the district court chose to order a
summary jury proceeding in an effort to promote settlement. The district
court decided that the SJT was to be an open proceeding since it was an
action affecting the interests of the community as a whole. NLO strongly
objected to opening the SJT to the public. The district court rejected the
request and opened the SJT to the public. Following the SJT, the parties
settled for $78 million. 59
The following year, those workers and individuals who were in
frequent contact with the NLO facility, along with their families, brought a
class action against NLO claiming they sustained three types of harm as a
result of their exposure to hazardous materials at the facility. This harm
included an increased risk of disease, emotional distress as a result of the
awareness of an increased risk of disease, and actual disease. 60
The SJT, in this case, was ordered open to the public by the district
court at the final pretrial conference for the summary jury trial. NLO
petitioned the court for reconsideration of the order for an open SJT
proceeding. 61 The district court declined to close the SJT. The court cited
precedent establishing the Sixth Circuit's willingness to permit federal
district courts the discretion to close SJT proceedings to the public. 62 The
court reasoned that if a federal district court possesses the power to close an
SJT, despite First Amendment implications, then federal courts surely
5 6 FED. R. Civ. P. 16(f).
57 In re Fernald, No. C-1-85-149, 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17761 (S.D. Ohio 1993).
5 8 id.
59 Day, 147 F.R.D. at 150.
60 Id.
611d.
62 Cincinnati Gas & Elec. Co. v. General Elec. Co., 854 F.2d 900, 900 (6th Cir. 1988).
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possess the ability to exercise the less constitutionally offensive power to
order an SJT open to the public. Any concern that NLO might have
regarding a polluted jury trial could be addressed through such procedural
safeguards as a change of venue. The court held that it was impractical to
close a class action proceeding which involved a large number of plaintiffs.
Enforcement of a gag order upon all members of the class who were
concededly entitled to be present at the SJT would be not only impractical,
but also impossible. The court reasoned that a closed proceeding, given the
facts of this case, would do little to realistically shield NLO from disclosure
to the press.63
This case involved the public interest. NLO was indemnified by the
United States, and, as a result, taxpayers would be forced to pay any
judgment rendered against NLO. The court adamantly asserted that the
determination as to whether an SJT proceeding would be open or closed was
within the court's "managerial discretion." 64 Additionally, the court was
able to call Judge Lambros, who pioneered the development of the SJT in
the federal court system, to its support. Judge Lambros conducts open SJTs
in his court and has stated that the decision to close such a proceeding is
properly left to the discretion of the court. 65
Day v. NLO, Inc. was consistent with standing precedent both within
the Sixth Circuit and all the other federal circuits. The Seventh Circuit
represented the only circuit which did not recognize the power of a federal
district court to order an SJT, compel attendance and active participation,
and sanction those parties failing to comply. 66
In its decision, the court in Day cited Cincinnati Gas & Electric Co. v.
General Electric Co.67 as precedent for the recognition of the authority of a
district court to open or close SJT proceedings based upon a discretionary
evaluation of the particular facts of the case. Such an evaluation should be
premised upon at least insuring the utility of an SJT proceeding as an
effective settlement device. The court upheld the power of a district court to
order a compulsory SJT.
The court in Cincinnati Gas held that the First Amendment right of
access does not attach to an SJT proceeding. 68 A court may close the
proceedings and bar public access. The court recognized that the SJT is a
settlement device deriving its value from its ability to foster settlement. It is
not a trial on the merits. Open SJT proceedings threaten to deter settlement.
6 3 Day, 147 F.R.D. at 152.
64 Id. at 151.
6 5 Id. at 152.
66 See Katz, supra note 23, at 6.
67 854 F.2d 900 (6th Cir. 1988).
68 M at 903.
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If an open SJT proceeding defeats the very purpose for which it was
devised, the trial court has the discretion to close it.69 SJTs were historically
closed proceedings out of recognition of this fact. The court thus held the
SJT proceeding was to be closed to the public. 70
C. The Summary Jury Trial in the Majority of Federal Circuits
The court in Day, after interpreting Cincinnati Gas, found that
substantial discretionary powers properly reside in the district court. The
ability of a district court to close an SJT proceeding, despite the existence of
competing First Amendment imperatives, was expressly authorized by the
Cincinnati Gas decision. 71 The court in Day reasoned that the exercise of
the lesser power to compel open SJT proceedings in the face of party dissent
was vested within the discretion of the district court.72
The district court's decision in Day reflected the general consensus
among federal courts that Rule 16 vested the courts with substantial
discretion in their efforts to expedite litigation. For example, the Eastern
District of Pennsylvania upheld a compulsory arbitration program for civil
claims of fifty thousand dollars ($50,000) or less falling within enumerated
classifications. 73 Under that district court's compulsory arbitration program,
the arbitrator's award became final and binding upon the parties if neither
party demanded a trial de novo within twenty days of the filing of the
award. 74 The court held that the failure of a party to appear or attempt to
appear at a compulsory arbitration hearing precluded its ability to later
demand a trial de novo. 75 Thus, a party is unable to let the arbitrator render
an ex parte hearing and then demand a trial de novo to re-establish its
original intent to pursue resolution through the courts.
The parties were, in effect, required to expend time and energy upon a
procedure they felt inadequate to address their needs. Failure to actively
participate in the arbitration hearing transformed it from a means by which
the alternatives for resolution were expanded into a tool by which the
alternatives available to a litigant were limited. The court recognized that a
mandatory arbitration hearing in which one party fails to cooperate renders
69 Cincinnati Gas, 854 F.2d. at 904.
70 Id. at 903.
71 Day, 147 F.R.D. at 151.
72 id.
73 New England Merchants Nat'l Bank v. Hughes, 556 F. Supp. 712, 712 (E.D. Pa.
1983).
74 1d. at 714.
75 Id. at 715.
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the proceeding an unnecessary delay to the final disposition of the case. 76
However, the court chose to hold the dissenting party culpable for the
failure of the proceeding, even though it was imposed upon the party
against its will.
77
The SJT has been an ADR mechanism enthusiastically accepted by the
federal courts for promoting settlement and effectively managing
burdensome caseloads. In Federal Reserve Banks of Minneapolis.v. Carey-
Canada, Inc.,78 the Eighth Circuit addressed a case in which all parties
formally objected to the imposition of an SJT proceeding by a U.S.
Magistrate. The parties were required to participate despite their requests to
be excused from participating. 79 The District Court of Minnesota overruled
the parties' objections stating: "[tihis court believes that, in a case such as
this, it is reasonable to require the parties to engage in settlement efforts
with some degree of intensity." 80 The court was willing to extend its
compulsory powers beyond mere attendance and participation and demand
that parties make satisfactory efforts in the estimations of the district court
judge.
In Carey-Canada, the plaintiff alleged the defendant's fireproofing of
the Federal Reserve Bank with products containing asbestos resulted in
substantial damage to the health of its employees as well as substantial
property damage. 81 Both parties objected to the SJT, asserting that the SIT
would not provide an accurate synopsis of a jury trial since a number of
major evidentiary rulings would not be made until weeks after the scheduled
SJT.82
The court rejected the contention that voluntary participation by the
parties was integral to the success of an alternative dispute resolution
mechanism such as a SJT. The court cited practical policy considerations as
controlling: "The need to compel parties to address settlement, is an
integral aspect of the docket management function of the court in this era of
complex, protracted litigation.... The SJT provides a means by which to
eliminate these barriers to settlement."83 The docket management function
of the district court superseded the rights of litigants to autonomously
choose the manner in which to vindicate their rights. The Carey-Canada
76 New England, 556 F. Supp. at 715.
77 id.
78 Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis v. Carey-Canada Inc., 123 F.R.D. 603, 604-05
(D. Minn. 1988).
7 9 Id. at 603.
8
°Id. at 607.
81 Carey-Canada, 123 F.R.D. at 603.
82 Id. at 604.
83 Id. at 604-05.
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court joined several other district courts when it authorized federal courts to
mandate summary jury trials.
The Middle District of Florida has the worst record nationally for
delays and backlogs in the disposition of its cases. 84 In 1985, the Eleventh
Circuit began using the SJT as an effective tool against the litigation crisis
which then plagued the courts in that circuit.a5 When the Eleventh Circuit
was forced to decide whether courts possessed the power to compel
mandatory summary jury trials, it forthrightly stated: "[l]itigants are
entitled to their day in court, but not, somebody else's day."6 The court
pointed to what they termed "the obvious purpose" of Rule 16 which was
"to allow courts the discretion and processes necessary for intelligent and
effective case management and disposition."87 The Eleventh Circuit
expressly found the Strandell precedent of the Seventh Circuit as neither
binding or persuasive.88
4. In re NLO
NLO, Inc. sought a writ of mandamus to vacate the ruling in Day
which required NLO to participate in an SJT open to the public. The United
States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit granted the petition and issued
a writ of mandamus on September 17, 1993. The court vacated the order of
the district court which required NLO to participate in an SJT proceeding. 89
The court broke from established precedent within the circuit and
throughout the federal circuits, with the lone exception of the Seventh
Circuit which had held similarly six years earlier.90 The court held an order
compelling participation in an SJT clearly erroneous as a matter of law. 91
The Sixth Circuit recognized broad discretionary powers were vested in
the district courts to manage their dockets efficiently and effectively. 2
However, the court also recognized necessary limitations upon the exercise
of this power. The Sixth Circuit looked to the Advisory Committee notes to
Rule 16(c)(7) for guidance in its interpretation of the authority granted to
courts under the rule.93 The court found the notes revealed that the rule was
84 Arabian American Oil Co. v. Scarfone, 119 F.R.D. 448, 448-49 (M.D. Fla. 1980).
8 5 Id. at 449.
8 6 id.
87 Id. at 448-49.
88 Scarfone, 119 F.R.D. at 448.
89 In re NLO, Inc., 5 F.3d at 155.
90 Day v. NLO, Inc., 147 F.R.D. 148, 157 (S.D. Ohio 1993).
9 1 In reNLO, 5 F.3d at 155.
9 2 Id. at 156 (construing Cincinnati Gas, 854 F.2d at 903 n.4.)
93 In re NLO, 5 F.3d at 157.
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meant to authorize judicial encouragement of ADR, but not the coercion of
parties to reach a settlement. The court held a compulsory SIT represented
an "unwarranted extension of [the] judicial power. " 94 Any attempt made by
the courts to derail litigants from the conventional track of litigation
breached the limits of their authority.
The Sixth Circuit considered the practical implications of a compulsory
SJT unsatisfactory. The court believed that once SJT became the product of
compulsion its utility as a settlement mechanism would be defeated.
Voluntary cooperation by the parties was necessary to maximize the
potential benefit of the proceeding. The court asserted that the American
justice system continues to be predicated upon an adversarial relationship
between the parties.95 This cannot be ignored when implementing an SJT
within the adversarial system. This led the court to conclude: "Compelling
an unwilling litigant to undergo this [SJT] process improperly interposes the
tribunal into the normal adversarial course of litigation." 96 Additionally, the
court found the time and expense extracted from litigants by virtue of an
order of compulsory participation lacked adequate justification. No matter
how short in duration or minimal in cost, the harm of a compulsory SJT
was "unnecessary and irremediable." 97
The decision in In re NLO, Inc. is not a radical departure from Sixth
Circuit precedent if one examines the decision rendered in Cincinnati Gas
more closely. There the court was confronted with opposition to the
decision to close an SJT proceeding. Opponents to the court's decision to
close the proceeding invoked the First Amendment in their defense.
Conversely, in In re NLO, Inc., the court was faced with opposition to the
decision to open an SJT to the public. In its opinion, the Sixth Circuit
emphasized that the SJT has historically been a closed proceeding. 98
In Cincinnati Gas, the SJT was undertaken with the voluntary
cooperation of both the parties once the court had insured the proceeding
would be closed to the public. The SJT in In re NLO, Inc. was undertaken
without the cooperation of NLO, and failed to accommodate the parties'
need for confidentiality as had the court in Cincinnati Gas. The court in
Cincinnati Gas recognized that the proper aim of the district court should be
to act so as to facilitate the voluntary cooperation of the parties in
conducting an SJT.99
Most importantly, the court stated that, where a party is found to have
94 In re NLO, 5 F.3d at 157.
95 Id. at 158.
96 Id.
9 7 1Id. at 159.
98 Cincinnati Gas, 854 F.2d at 903-04.
99 1& at 904.
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a legitimate interest in confidentiality, and public access would be
detrimental to the effectiveness of the SJT as a settlement mechanism,
deference should be afforded to protect the litigant's privacy interest. 100 The
court equated the litigant's interest in privacy with the government's interest
in providing an effective settlement device. Both interests were promoted
through closure of the SJT. The court concluded, "[tihus, public access to
summary jury trials over the parties' objections would have significant
adverse effects on the utility of the procedure as a settlement device." 10 1 In
re NLO, Inc. merely served to extend this rationale when that court held
compulsory party attendance and participation at summary jury trials over
the parties' objections has significant adverse effects on the utility of the
procedure as a settlement device.102 In re NLO, Inc. did not represent a
departure from precedent so much as it represented a logical conclusion to
its final end.
The 1990s present the federal courts with the arduous task of defining
limits to the breadth and depth of ADR once it has been transposed upon the
American adversarial system. The Sixth Circuit has come to the crossroads
and has chosen to take the path less traveled. In denying the district courts
the authority to compel attendance and participation at a summary jury trial,
the Sixth Circuit has remained faithful to the underlying values which
motivated the development of ADR in the United States, and has promoted
the achievement of the purposes for which it was originally conceived.
At its inception, ADR represented an attempt to escape the rigid
formalities of the conventional adversarial system. It emphasized the values
of cooperation and compromise. It recognized that adherence to mechanized
procedure sometimes fail to adequately address the needs of litigants or
offer adequate solutions to complex problems. The resolution to some
disputes necessitated individualized attention as opposed to attention to the
needs of an inanimate legal system. ADR privatized the resolution of
disputes while retaining the tempering influence of an objective third party.
As a result, courts and legislatures enthusiastically welcomed the benefits of
ADR. 103
However, the utilization of ADR cannot be accomplished through the
use of tools taken from the adversarial toolbox. ADR requires litigants to
engage in a process of reconciliation and conciliation. But more
importantly, it requires parties to approach the process in the proper state of
mind. This cannot be judicially mandated.
100 Cincinnati Gas, 854 F.2d at 904.
101 Id.
102 In re NLO, 5 F.3d at 157-58.
103 ANNUAL ASSESSMENT, supra note 1; The Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990; and the
Administrative Dispute Resolution Act of 1990.
[Vol. 10:1 1994]
COERCED COOPERATION IN ADR
The grass roots movement of the 1980s endorsed the use of ADR
because it nurtured a state of mind which valued the preservation of
relationships. ADR abandoned adversarial concepts in favor of a long-term
perspective favoring cooperation and compromise. The authorization of
sanctions by the courts for the failure of parties to actively participate in
ADR procedures, which they have involuntarily been forced to utilize,
signifies a fundamental misunderstanding of the basic premises of ADR.
B. Federal Legislation Authorizing Compulsory ADR Mechanisms
The court in In re NLO, Inc. noted that Congress has repeatedly
considered specific grants of compulsory authority to the courts in the past
and, on each occasion, declined to vote them into law. 104 The United States
House of Representatives recently passed a bill which authorizes federal
judges to assign a number of their smaller cases to a court-appointed
arbitrator.105 Litigants retain the right to proceed through the formal legal
system if no resolution can be reached through arbitration. Courts would be
empowered to design arbitration programs for claims involving $150,000 or
less. The programs could be voluntary or mandatory. 10 6
Since 1988, ten federal district courts have experimented with
mandatory arbitration programs. 10 7 The ten pilot districts have also
instituted voluntary arbitration programs. The reviews of the pilot programs
have been mixed. The Judicial Conference withdrew its support from the
portion of the bill which authorizes mandatory arbitration. 108 According to
the Judicial Conference, the mandatory arbitration provision served only to
add another layer to the litigation which an unwilling party must confront.
Proponents of the bill include the American Bar Association and the Federal
Judicial Center. 109
The courts and Congress are at a crossroads. Senate passage of the bill
would mark the course by which ADR is to travel into the next century.
The possibility that voluntarism may be discarded will transform the
fundamental nature and scope of ADR mechanisms in the twenty-first
century.
'04 In re NO, 5 F.3d at 158.
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C. State Legislation Authorizing Compelled ADR Mechanisms
Ohio has legislated ADR mechanisms into its statutory framework.
Similar to efforts on the federal level, state efforts involve both voluntary
and involuntary procedures. ADR legislation covers a broad range of areas.
Section 2711 of the Ohio Revised Code110 covers a substantial number of
the arbitration provisions under Ohio law. ADR has been utilized in areas
ranging from divorce to mental health board proceedings. 11 In response to
the business community's affinity for the private resolution of disputes, the
Ohio legislature has instituted measures designed to insure that contractual
provisions mandating the use of ADR will be upheld by the courts.1
12
1. The Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990 (CJRA) and The United States
District Court for the Northern District of Ohio
For the year 1992, the United States District Court for the Northern
District of Ohio completed an Annual Assessment of the Civil and Criminal
Dockets pursuant to the Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990 (CJRA). The
CJRA requires that each U.S. District Court annually assess its docket in
order to formulate provisions which better insure the cost-efficient and time-
efficient management of each court's caseload. 113
The district court for the Northern District of Ohio instituted several
new programs during 1992. All have enjoyed favorable results. One of the
new programs provides for a comprehensive tracking program. Cases are
assigned to one of five processing tracks following review by a judicial
officer to insure differentiated case management techniques. 114 Another new
program, termed the "Docket Equalization Process" (DCM), insures that
new cases are dispersed among judges proportionally according to their
pending docket caseload. 115 The first year results indicated new case filings
were resolved at a "significantly quicker pace under DCM."1 16 The district
court also has been designated a Pilot District for voluntary arbitration. 117
The United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio is on
the forefront of change in the field of ADR. The district has actively
undertaken measures designed to better define the use of ADR, provide for
110 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2711 (Anderson 1992).
111 See generally OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 2711.21 (Anderson 1992).
112 OHiO REv. CODE ANN. § 2711.01 (Anderson 1992).
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its use, and limit its application. The court has instituted a settlement week
and published guidelines for court-annexed summary jury trials. 118 In so
doing, it has attempted to prevent the formulation of a haphazard patchwork
quilt of ADR use within the district and has instead chosen to provide an
informed, cohesive framework in which ADR may operate.
2. Ohio Revised Code §§ 3109.052 & 3109.041
The area of domestic relations has been an arena in which the use of
ADR has been favored by the legislature. ADR is typically praised for its
ability to address the context in which these conflicts occur. Long-term
conflictive relationships and their accompanying complexities may be taken
into account while attempting to arrive at a tenable solution which will
enable parties to preserve a working relationship.
In 1990, the Ohio legislature passed R.C. § 3109.052 into law." 9 The
statute authorizes the state court to order parties to mediate their differences
concerning a shared parenting decree in a divorce, dissolution, legal
separation, or annulment proceeding.
Ohio Revised Code § 3109.041 outlines the mediation procedure to be
followed by the court. Parties are required to jointly file a mediation report
with the court.
The mediation report must indicate whether an agreement has been
reached and the content and details of any such agreement. Inclusion of
background information or any information discussed or revealed during the
mediation is forbidden. The mediation report may serve as a basis of
consideration for the judge in determining the proper allocation of
responsibilities under the shared parenting agreement. However, the court is
not bound by the mediation report. The best interests of the children or
child is of paramount importance in the formulation of the shared parenting
decree. Judicial discretion is afforded great latitude. 120
Limitations upon the power of a state court to compel arbitration are
integrated into the statute. The statute also allows for flexibility in
procedure according to local rule and judicial discretion. 121
Two important limitations are placed upon the discretion of the trial
judge. First, the judge must make an initial determination that mediation is
in the best interests of the parties. 122 The judge is free to consider the
totality of circumstances surrounding the dispute in determining whether
118 ANNuAL ASSESSMENT, supra note 1, at 16.
119 OHO REv. CODE ANN. § 3109.052 (Anderson Supp. 1993).
120 id.
121 Id. § 3109.041.
12 2 Id. § 3109.052.
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mediation is appropriate. The statute identifies circumstances under which
mediation should be subjected to stricter judicial scrutiny. A record of
previous offenses or abusive acts against a family member is a legislatively-
mandated factor for heightened scrutiny. 123 Second, if one parent holds such
a record or falls within an express classification outlined in the statute, the
trial judge must not only make an initial determination that mediation is in
the best interests of the parties, but must also make specific, written
findings of fact justifying the order to mediate. 14
The authority given the trial court judge includes the ability to order
submission of the mediation report within a specified time period in order to
facilitate a timely disposition of the matter. 125 The court may also order
either party or both parties to pay costs. Parties are free to request waiver of
the required payment and may be excused from payment for good cause.126
The statute serves to preserve the integrity of the mediation process by
precluding the possibility that a mediator may be made a party or forced to
testify at a later proceeding. The statute expressly forbids any attempt to
make a mediator party to any consequent civil action or testify at such a
proceeding. 127
The Ohio statute represents a piece of legislation which attempts to
balance the competing interests. The statute defines limits yet remains
flexible. However, considerable discretion is left with the trial court judge.
Just as substantial discretion is left to the mediator in conducting a
mediation hearing, legislatures are forced to assign similar levels of
discretion to judges. This seems an inevitable by-product when integrating
ADR into an adversarial system. The judge comes to represent the neutral
third party who helps facilitate settlement.
3. Boone County Circuit Court: Pilot Arbitration Project
The Northern Kentucky Bar Association appointed a committee in 1989
to investigate ways to remedy the backlog of cases clogging the Boone
County Circuit Court of Kentucky. The court was the fastest growing
county in all of Kentucky, yet had only one judge to staff the circuit court.
The judge who served the Boone County Circuit Court was also required to
devote time to serve the Gallatin County Court. 128






128 Christopher J. Mahling & Donald Stephner, Court-Annexed Arbitration-The
Northern Kentucky Expereince, 81 KY. L.J. 1155 (1993).
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The committee appointed by the Kentucky Bar Association began to
develop a proposal for court-annexed arbitration in the Boone Circuit Court
in late 1989 and early 1990.129 The primary purposes of the proposal were
to lower both the cost of litigation and the burdensome caseload the court
was being forced to carry. The proposal was formulated to foster a feeling
in participating litigants that they had been given "their day in court."1 30
Cases eligible for participation in the program are limited to those which
involve $25,000 or less.131 All those cases which involve claims in excess
of $25,000 require the consent of all parties to arbitration.' 32 The
arbitrators have been deemed to possess no equity powers so all equity cases
are unilaterally excluded. As a result, cases in the area of domestic or
family law may not utilize the program.133
While committee members realized the importance of party cooperation
and satisfaction, they placed equal, if not greater, value on brevity,
uniformity, and most importantly, finality. Committee members believed
the program must be able to impose resolution on parties who remain unable
to agree. The committee concluded that arbitration was the vehicle best
equipped to help them achieve these goals. 134
The arbitration program of Hamilton County, Ohio was chosen as the
model after which the Boone County Circuit Court arbitration program
would be fashioned. The Boone County arbitration program requires parties
to submit their filing fees within thirty (30) days of being referred to the
program. Once such fees are paid, the Kentucky Bar Association appoints a
panel of three arbitrators to preside at the hearing. The parties enjoy the
right to opt for one arbitrator, rather than three, to conduct the hearing.
Additionally, recognition of the need for party volition is further evidenced
by the right of each party to block the referral by filing a written objection
to the arbitration proceeding within ten (10) days of the referral order. 135
The Kentucky Rules of Evidence are relaxed and modified for the
arbitration proceeding. For example, expert testimony may be admitted via
a written statement. The time spent and cost incurred by the hearing are
thereby reduced. Fourteen days before the hearing, parties submit and
exchange documents which they intend to use at the arbitration hearing.
Documents not exchanged at this time may not later be used at the hearing.
It is important to note that the Boone County Circuit Court program
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undertook affirmative efforts to publicize and educate the local legal
community out of recognition of this need. Quite similarly, C. Eileen Pruett
of the Dispute Resolution Program for the Supreme Court of Ohio had
emphasized the concurrent need to educate both attorneys and judges about
the processes and substance of alternative dispute resolution mechanisms
when implementing ADR into a formal adversarial system. The Kentucky
Bar Association newsletter publicized the Arbitration Program and steps
were taken to encourage members to volunteer their time to participate in
the program. ADR educational programs were permitted by the Kentucky
Bar Association to be taken for CLE credit. Similarly, the Ohio Supreme
Court is currently attempting to make CLE credit available for those
wishing to attend programs and seminars on ADR. 136
The initial results of the Boone County program have been positive. No
party has yet to opt out. The average time from the referral order to the
final resolution of a case is four months. The costs incurred by the parties
have been dramatically reduced and the court's docket has been made more
manageable. 137
However, it is important to note that some advocates of the program
have begun to recommend that a strict cost-benefit analysis be utilized to
maximize the value of the program. As a direct result, recommendations
designed to excise what little remains of voluntarism and consent within the
arbitration program have been made. Advocates suggest that by raising the
jurisdictional amount from $25,000 to $50,000, more cases could be caught
in the net of arbitration and thereby be resolved more efficiently. It has also
been suggested that the right of parties to opt out of the arbitration program
be denied. Advocates of the elimination of the opt out provision claim that
parties retain the right to demand a trial de novo, and this provides them
with adequate protection. 138 These advocates apparently assign no value to
the needless time, energy, and moneys expended on a futile resolution
mechanism.
The Kentucky program appears to be at the same crossroads at Which
many other similar programs across the nation have found themselves.
Court-annexed ADR appears to be a slippery slope which courts and
legislatures must carefully demarcate and monitor. The aforementioned
elimination of the opt out provision and increased jurisdictional amount
threaten to proceed without recognition of the fact that some disputes may
require formal discovery, the rules of evidence, and a well-defined
136 Pruelt, supra note 2. Pruett outlined efforts by the Supreme Court of Ohio
Committee on Dispute Resolution to institute mandatory ADR educational requirements for
Ohio judges and attorneys.
137 id.
138 Mahling & Stephner, supra note 128, at 1163.
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procedural process. Some disputes may be too costly to be resolved
informally or privately. They require public adjudication. The Kentucky
arbitration seems to recognize this in its original formulation. However,
recent suggestions made for the modification of the program reflect an
ardent desire for the most cost-efficient and time-efficient ends to the
resolution of every dispute absent any recognition of the fact that part of the
original value assigned to ADR lay in its ability to utilize the "means" by
which it pursued resolution to validate its "end." ADR is not a
methodology which unilaterally endorses the proposition that the ends
always justifies the means.
4. Court-Annexed ADR: A Dissent
The Honorable Rodney S. Webb, Chief Judge of the United States
District Court for the District of North Dakota, emphasizes the need for
many proponents of ADR to remain conscious of the fact that ADR is not
only procedurally distinguishable from formal adjudication, but also is
substantively different as well.139 The Seventh Amendment to the United
States Constitution guarantees the right to trial by jury, not the right to the
"resolution" of a dispute by qualified experts from the legal field or other
similar professions. As such, Judge Webb considers the civil jury trial
properly termed "traditional dispute resolution."140
Some critics of the unguided expansion of ADR, contend that ADR
cannot be equivocated in value and function with the traditional civil jury
trial. They are entirely different in form, substance, meaning, and function.
Instead, critics like Judge Webb, advocate the expansion and improvement
of the traditional justice system to enable it to provide greater efficiency
while retaining the important values inherent in formal adjudication. The
answer lies not in abandoning adjudication and replacing it with ADR, but
rather the proper solution is to work to improve adjudication so that it may
meet the needs of a changing society. Minor changes are wise; wholesale
exchange of one system for another wages an assault on the constitutional
foundations of the nation. 141
Such minor changes would include affirmative action on the part of
legislators to prudently consider the effects of any further "federalization"
of law, expansion of the magistrate judge support system, and the
completion of a comprehensive computerization of the federal justice
system. 142 In sum, it may be argued that ADR is not an alternative
139 Rodney S. Webb, Annexed ADR-A Dissent, 70 N. DAK. L. Rzv. 229 (1994).
140 Id. at 230.
141 Id. at 232.
142Id
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resolution so much as it is a different resolution to any given dispute.
The fundamental differences between the two resolution processes are
exemplified in those cases in which there is a power imbalance between the
parties. 143 ADR fails to provide mechanisms comparable to available
adjudicative mechanisms which serve to level the playing field upon which
litigants must play. Although ADR might often foster a perception of
equality, the implicit power imbalances work to produce unjust result or to
compromise an already compromised resolution process. As such, courts
provide the best vehicle for the vindication of the individual right for the
oppressed minority classes or persons: the very purpose for which this
nation was founded. The value of this service is timeless and priceless. It is
a service for which the federal courts were created and uniquely equipped to
provide. Those wishing to draw lines of limitation upon the expansion of
ADR argue that alternative dispute resolution processes are properly made
available to litigants by the private sphere according to their own volition.
They charge that those wishing to foster the illusion that ADR provides one
with "one's day in court" pervert the original value of ADR. For "one's
day in court," there can be no substitute.
5. The Quandary of the Judiciary and the Problem of Misguided
Legislative Zeal
Courts and legislatures must recognize the inherent limitations of ADR
in an adversarial legal system and the paradox limitations of simultaneously
requiring a judge to serve as both mediator and adjudicator. Additionally,
courts and legislatures must be willing to recognize that attorneys and
legislators must become better educated about ADR and its potential uses
and abuses before implementing it into practice. 144 The value of the
recognition of these facts is limited. In the 1990s, courts and legislatures
must be forced to face the inadequacies of an adversarial system serving as a
foundation for the imposition of a system of ADR mechanisms. Not only
must limits be placed on the sanctioned means and ends of ADR, but courts
and legislatures must also recognize that ADR in an adversarial context is
inherently limited, if not flawed.
A judge can never serve as the functional equivalent to a mediator or
negotiator. This is due to the simple fact that judges are not, in fact, neutral
third parties. The aforementioned pieces of legislation represent legislative
recognition of the fact that the duty and function of the judiciary is a
product of the law which it seeks to enforce. Once the expedition of cases
through alternative dispute resolution mechanisms is legislatively mandated,
143 Webb, supra note 139, at 232.
144 Pruett, supra note 2.
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the judiciary can approach the adjudicative forum armed with imperatives of
its own. Judges and courts share an interest independent of the litigants.
Every attorney and judge serves as an officer of the court. They are bound
by oaths. They have a duty to preserve the integrity and promote the values
of the American justice system.
Allegiance to the values of the American justice system in the 1990s
requires judges to promote the time-efficient and cost-efficient disposition
of cases in the face of a litigation crisis which threatens to compromise the
integrity of the system as a whole. Legislatures share the same goal which
aims at the systemic preservation of the adversarial system. Legislatures are
actively trying to fashion resolutions that will alleviate the burden. In doing
so, they have placed judges in a role which they cannot competently
perform. Judges are not neutral third parties. They represent the rule of law
and the interests of the whole. The interests of the whole in systemic
efficiency and expediency may often conflict with the individual interests of
litigants. The potential danger of ADR extending beyond a mere
compromise between two parties into a three-way compromise with a
judiciary searching for the most time-efficient and cost-efficient results must
be addressed.
Legislatures have approached ADR enthusiastically, but superficially.
Lines must be drawn and limitations realized. Vesting substantial amounts
of discretion in a non-neutral third party must be re-evaluated. The question
which faces courts and legislatures in the 1990s is whether their approach to
the implementation of ADR must be modified to conform to the underlying
theoretical underpinnings of ADR as a voluntary process of cooperation and
conciliation or whether ADR must redefine itself to conform to compelling
public policy mandates. The Sixth Circuit has chosen to answer
affirmatively to the former proposition. The Sixth Circuit requires that
ADR mechanisms, utilized to facilitate settlement, conform to the original,
theoretical underpinnings of ADR. 145
IV. CONCLUSION
On the federal, state, and county levels, the use of ADR is increasing
and expanding. With its expansion must come an awareness and definition
of its limits. No uniform definition of its limits has been recognized. Courts
and legislatures have been left to fashion a haphazard patchwork quilt of the
permissible contexts in which ADR may be used and cooperation
compelled. Compulsory ADR is a development that must be addressed
quickly and competently. The potential influence of this development upon
the evolution of ADR in the twenty-first century is readily apparent.
145 In re NLO, Inc., 5 F.3d 154, 156-57 (6th Cir. 1993).
OHIO STATE JOURNAL ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION
The debate surrounding the use of compulsory participation in ADR
mechanisms is a one over the proper public policy agenda. It is a debate
which may change the perception of litigants from one in which ADR
mechanisms are viewed as a potential remedy to one in which they are
viewed as a potential sanction.
The strengths and weaknesses on each side of the debate have been
identified. Those favoring ADR rely upon Rule 16 as authority for the
practical recognition of the fact that courts must be vested with "the
discretion and processes necessary for intelligent and effective case
management and policies." 146 Proponents assert that without the use of such
compulsory measures, the system will be compromised to the detriment of
the majority of litigants and the system as a whole. An extraordinary
backlog of cases delays resolution, and justice delayed is justice denied for
many. Proponents argue that judges and legislatures are in a far better
position to identify and effectively serve the needs of the parties and the
system. They contend that parties often operate under a set of unrealistic
expectations and perceptions of the formal justice system. The ideology and
idealism of parties corrupts and distorts the system.
Critics of compulsory ADR mechanisms recognize the need of the
judiciary to insure efficient caseload management, but claim that this need
must be balanced against the fundamental rights of individual litigants.
Compulsory SJTs represent the systemic needs of an overburdened formal
justice system taking precedence over the autonomy of litigants. Through
the introduction of compulsory ADR mechanisms, a new adversary has been
introduced into the adversarial context. The federal judiciary, as
representative for an overburdened formal justice system, has been charged
by Congress to pursue its own agenda in the management of cases which
comes before it. Critics charge that a compulsory SJT proceeding
impermissibly and unnecessarily infringes on the rights of litigants to fully
utilize the adversarial process if they so choose. Compulsory SJT
proceedings seriously affect the nature and parameters of the well-
established rights of litigants and their attorneys to work product privilege
and restrictions on the scope of pretrial discovery. Opponents to compulsory
SJT proceedings claim that any delay or additional cost imposed upon
unwilling litigants improperly interposes judicial discretion where
individual discretion properly resides. Such delays are not only
unnecessary, but are irremediable as well. Critics claim that a compelled
SJT proceeding represents an "unwarranted extension of judicial power. "147
Compulsory ADR mechanisms are being implemented by courts and
legislatures which are not adequately educated in the methodology and
14 6 FED. R. CIV. P. 16.
147 In re NLO, 5 F.3d at 157-58.
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ideology inherent in ADR. Attorneys and legislatures must become better
schooled in ADR techniques before attempting to implement and interpose
them in a variety of areas within the context of an adversarial system. Out
of recognition of this need, the Supreme Court of Ohio Committee on
Dispute Resolution has made formal recommendations to the Court that it
mandate continuing legal education in dispute resolution concepts for judges
in Ohio and a one-time mandatory continuing legal education requirement in
dispute resolution concepts for attorneys within the state. 148
The Sixth Circuit has come to the crossroads at which contrasting
perspectives meet and draw lines of limitation. The Sixth Circuit has
recognized a substantial difference between the encouragement and proper
facilitation of early settlement and attempts to coerce settlement.
Encouragement of out-of-court settlements is the proper goal of the courts
and legislatures in their approach to the use of ADR by the formal justice
system. Courts and legislatures, acting as agents of coercion in order to
expedite the disposition of cases which overcrowd the judicial dockets, is
not. Once voluntarism is discarded, many ADR mechanisms can be
transformed into adversarial tools wielded by adjudicators pursuing
settlement.
Courts and legislatures must decide whether ADR is to serve as a
vehicle by which "community" can be preserved and individual needs may
be more competently addressed through accommodation and voluntary
cooperation, or whether individual litigants must learn to accommodate the
pressing, communal need for efficiency and economy in the legal justice
system of a modern nation-state. A balance must be struck and lines must be
drawn. Can ADR mechanisms afford to respect individual autonomy in the
face of systemic crisis? The Sixth Circuit has answered this question in the
affirmative. 149 Courts and legislatures across this nation must address this
fundamental question and, in so doing, chart the course of ADR into the
next century.
Kelli E. Tyrrell
148 Preliminary Report of the Committee to the Supreme Court of Ohio,
Recommendations Four & Five, pp. 18-21; The Supreme Court of Ohio Committee on
Dispute Resolution, Columbus, Ohio (Sept. 1991).
149 Report, supra note 148, at 18-21.

